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Abstract 
Match fixing is a growing threat to the integrity of sport, facilitated by new online in-play 
betting markets sufficiently liquid to allow substantial profits to be made from manipulating 
an event. Screens to detect a fix employ in-play forecasting models whose predictions are 
compared in real-time with observed betting odds on websites around the World. Suspicions 
arise where model odds and market odds diverge. We provide real examples of monitoring 
for football and tennis matches and describe how suspicious matches are investigated by 
analysts before a final assessment of how likely it was that a fix took place is made. Results 
from monitoring driven by this application of forensic statistics have been accepted as 
primary evidence at cases in the Court of Arbitration for Sport, leading more sports outside 
football and tennis to adopt this approach to detecting and preventing manipulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The growth of online commerce since the Millennium has changed many aspects of society. 
One factor behind this revolution has been the massive increase in the speed with which 
information flows. The effects are at least as evident in the world of sports betting as 
anywhere else. Indeed, instead of only pre-match betting being available, the speed with 
which information on the progress of a sports event can transmit to bettors and bookmakers, 
and the speed with which wagers can be placed in response, make it practical now for 
bookmakers routinely to offer in-play betting: bets are placed while the match is in progress. 
The internet has been the catalyst for the rapid rise of in-play betting, which now makes up 
the majority of online betting turnover, for example 67% in Spain in 2017 (Gómez & 
Lalanda, 2018), and this has given birth to numerous new bookmakers around the world, and 
betting exchanges such as Betfair and Betdaq. 
 
With the increased availability of betting, and the advent of in-play betting, global sports 
betting activity has increased very rapidly. Between 2000 and 2010, annual Global GGR 
(Gross Gaming Revenue- the amount bookmakers win from their clients) from sports betting, 
defined to exclude bets on horses and dogs, was estimated to have grown from €6b to €19b 
(Sport Accord, 2011). By 2016, it was estimated as €30b (IRIS, 2017). Since intensifying 
competition was reducing bookmaker margins throughout this period, sports betting turnover 
will have increased even faster than these figures indicate. 
 
Some of the increase in activity will have been accounted for by the extension of the range of 
sports events on which wagering is offered. For example, bets can now be placed on youth 
games in football around the world and there are now active betting markets, particularly 
popular in Asia, on e-sports (Abarbanel & Johnson, 2018). Further increase in activity will 
have been brought about by increased volume on events already in the bookmaker offer. The 
net result is that there are now many highly liquid betting markets not only on elite sports 
competitions but also at relatively low levels of competition. For example, Boniface et al. 
(2012) reported that the consensus amongst a group of Asian betting agents was that bets of 
€300,000 could be placed on a Belgium Second division football match without attracting 
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undue attention. Where there is such high liquidity, substantial sums can be won if events on 
the field can manipulated. The danger is greatest where there is high liquidity in the betting 
market but low player wages since then prospective wins on the betting market are high and 
the cost of ‘buying’ a match from corrupt players relatively low (Forrest et al., 2008, Forrest, 
2012). Risk is elevated further in betting markets which are illegal or unregulated (Preston & 
Szymanski, 2003). Although the highest levels of sport have not been immune, the 
combination of high liquidity and low pay has applied in many fixing cases that have come to 
light, for example in matches in lower-division football in major football countries such as 
England and Spain, in top-tier football in lesser footballing powers such as Ireland and 
Sweden, and on the ATP Futures and Challenger Tours in tennis (where few players even 
cover their costs over the season).  
 
The threat to sport from match fixing has increasingly been regarded as serious. Indeed the 
then President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Jacques Rogge, believed that 
match fixing had a bigger impact than doping 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/davidbond/2011/03/match_fixing_is_now_a.html). 
Competitions where the play is not believed to be authentic cannot expect to continue to 
command public support. 
 
In response to the threat to integrity, sports governing bodies have begun to take action. In 
many sports, player education programmes have been put in place in the hope of increasing 
player resistance to corrupt practices; and sports rules have been amended to make failure to 
report suspicious approaches a serious disciplinary offence. Some well-resourced sports, such 
as cricket and tennis, have established international intelligence units, staffed by former 
senior police officers, to investigate and prosecute corruption. In a few countries, in 
anticipation of signing the Macolin Convention, ‘National Platforms’ have already been 
established to provide formal procedures for betting houses to notify sports governing bodies 
if they observe suspicious betting, such as unexpectedly high volume of betting on a 
particular outcome in a match. 
 
Against this background, researchers and practitioners have begun to ask whether the 
application of forensic statistics may be able to play a role in combatting the threat to sports 
integrity. 
 
 
2. Statistics and Corruption in Sport: a Review 
 
Statistical modelling has been proposed as a means of meeting two objectives for a sport. 
First, the sport should know the size of the problem it faces and therefore there is value in 
seeking to estimate prevalence-rates. Second, it will wish to detect cases of corruption with a 
view to excluding corrupt athletes from competition.  
 
Regarding estimation of prevalence-rates, the number of cases to become known (from 
whistle-blowing, intelligence, police inquiries, etc) is likely to be a poor guide because 
successful corruption is never directly observed. This is a common problem in assessing the 
scale of corruption in any sphere, not just sport. However, in the general literature on 
corruption, it has been shown that it might be possible to identify patterns in aggregate data, 
which are suggestive of the presence and magnitude of corruption. This approach has a long 
history of being applied in a variety of spheres where corruption takes place. For example, at 
one time, income tax due in the USA was a fixed amount depending on into which band of 
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income (each band $50 wide) the declared amount fell. Slemrod (1985) saw no reason why 
the true distribution of incomes in the population should not be continuous but found instead 
that the distribution of declared incomes featured a clustering of declared incomes just below 
each tax band boundary. The finding suggested that taxpayers were willing to under-declare, 
to avoid a jump in tax, and offered some clue as to how many taxpayers were willing to 
offend. 
 
Taking a somewhat similar approach, Wolfers (2006) examined results from more than 
44,000 college basketball matches in the USA. College basketball is a popular subject for 
betting and the most common type of wager is the handicap bet. The bookmaker announces 
that college X, the favourite in the match, is ‘expected’ to beat college Y by 9 points (‘the 
spread’). Their clients then bet on whether X will ‘beat the spread’, i.e. whether college X 
will win by more than 9 points or fail to win by more than 9 points. Against this background, 
proven corruption cases have usually featured ‘point shaving’. Bettors bribe players on the 
stronger team to hold back such that they fail to beat the spread (even though they still gain 
the sporting rewards for winning the match itself). 
 
Wolfers treated the spreads announced by the bookmaker as unbiased forecasts of the actual 
results relative to the spread, which might be expected to be normally distributed with a mean 
of 0. However, he identified a departure from the normal distribution in that there was an 
unexpectedly high number of observations where the favourite had just failed to beat the 
spread. He interpreted the excess number of such observations as indicative of the prevalence 
of point shaving and then estimated that around 6% of matches with a strong favourite (one 
favoured to win by at least 12 points), were ‘fixed’ (in this way). This would imply that 1% 
of all matches were ‘fixed’ (by point shaving). 
 
The conclusion that so many matches are fixed has been treated subsequently with some 
scepticism. Alternative explanations for the pattern observed in the data have been sought 
either in the betting market or by focusing on the strategic choices facing the teams in 
different on-court situations. In the betting market, the relatively high frequency of strong 
favourites failing to beat the spread may represent biases among bookmakers and bettors such 
that strong teams are, on average, over-rated (Borghesi et al., 2010), a failure of betting 
market efficiency. Bernhardt & Heston (2010) noted that a similar pattern of match results 
(relative to spread) had been found in professional NBA basketball as in the college game; 
favourites were more likely to win by a few less than by a few more points than the spread. 
But widespread fixing of NBA matches is implausible on account of very high player 
salaries. They suggested that the explanation might lie in strategy on the court. For example, 
basketball teams ahead by a moderate margin may maximise their chance of winning by 
engaging in time-wasting tactics, which reduce the rate of points production, rather than seek 
to win by the margin they could. Using more formal sports analytics including how 
incentives to foul evolve with the score, Gregory (2018) finds that models predict the same 
pattern of match results as Wolfers observed and interpreted as indicative of corruption.  
 
Statistical analysis has also been employed in seeking to uncover the scale of match fixing 
motivated by sporting rather than betting goals. Famously, Duggan & Levitt (2002) offered 
support for anecdotal talk of match fixing in Japanese sumo wrestling. The sport was 
organised such that each athlete took part in fifteen bouts in each tournament. Those who 
won eight times rose in the rankings whereas those who failed to win eight were demoted 
(and their salaries thereby reduced). Some individual contests at the end of a tournament 
therefore became crucial for one of the participants. Duggan & Levitt found that competitors 
 4 
for whom the bout was crucial won disproportionately often. This in itself could have had an 
innocent explanation because asymmetric rewards to winning would be expected to induce 
greater effort from the competitor with more to play for. However, this would not explain 
their finding that, next time the two competitors met, the loser of the first bout was 
disproportionately likely to win. This suggested collusion where at least part of the payment 
for giving the win to the fighter who needed it was in terms of future favours. Duggan & 
Levitt regarded the number of ‘excess wins’ in the follow-up matches as indicative of the 
scale of corruption in the sport. Subsequent papers have also focused on the distribution of 
outcomes in matches where a win was very important to one of the opposing participants. 
Jetter & Walker (2017) found excess wins in men’s professional tennis for players on the 
cusp of qualifying by world ranking for the immediately following Grand Slam tournament 
(which would be highly lucrative) and offered supplementary evidence that this was unlikely 
to be explained by incentives to effort. Employing match data from 75 countries, Elaad et al. 
(2018) focused on football matches where one of the teams was a relegation candidate but the 
other team had no strong stake in the outcome. The probability that the relegation candidate 
would win was significantly greater (both statistically and in terms of the effect size) in 
countries which had higher scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index published by 
Transparency International. 
 
All these papers identify a particular motive for match fixing a priori and then look for an 
elevated number of observations in a particular match result category (the favourite failing to 
beat the spread, the sumo wrestler facing demotion winning the bout, the tennis player on the 
cusp of qualifying for a Grand Slam winning the match, the football team struggling to retain 
its place in the division finishing victorious). The number of observations in the category is 
then found to be significantly elevated relative to what would be expected from a statistical 
model. However, in all the cases, the expected number of observations in the result category 
studied is still greater (many times as great in the college basketball example) than the 
number of ‘excess’ cases argued to be linked to manipulation. Thus, while the approach we 
have described may contribute to understanding the scale of match fixing of a specific type, it 
does not offer a viable means of identifying particular matches as fixed. A screen based on 
this approach would have low specificity. For example, only a small proportion of college 
basketball matches where the favourite fails to beat the spread will in fact be fixed. 
 
Alternative methods for employing forensic statistics to identify particular matches as fixed 
have therefore had to be developed.  Detection, if sufficiently reliable to support judicial or 
disciplinary proceedings, may lead directly to the exclusion of corrupt actors from the sport 
and deter others from participating in a fix.  
 
It might be thought that analysis of sports performance data would be a fruitful avenue to 
explore when seeking to identify individual instances of manipulation. After all, match fixing 
almost always involves underperformance by some, or all, participants in the sports event and 
underperformance should be reflected in the data. 
 
However, this approach has limitations because data from sport are inherently very noisy. 
Indeed the very essence of sport is that the unexpected may happen. It follows that the 
presence of corruption will be very imperfectly correlated with deviations from expected 
performance. Underperformance by athletes is very common and is at the heart of the 
uncertainty of outcome that drives the popularity of sport. 
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Jewell & Reade (2014) examined data from 18 one-day cricket internationals which were 
already known to have been fixed and compared them with data from all 3,510 one-day 
internationals played between 1971 and 2014. They found that statistics on individual 
performances reflected that manipulation was taking place. For example, in matches which 
had been fixed by one particular team, its batsmen, on average, recorded worse statistics than 
the average across all matches. They suggest that this points to potential benefits from using 
match data in the detection of match fixing. However, they fail to discuss whether this 
approach could lead to screens for detecting match fixing which would not yield a high 
proportion of false positives. Similar to other sports, batsmen in cricket frequently ‘fail’. 
Arguably, Sir Don Bradman was the most successful player in any team sport. Prior to his 
last innings in Test cricket, he had scored 6,996 Test runs with an average of 101.39. In his 
much anticipated final innings before retirement, he was dismissed for 0 bringing his career 
average down to 99.94. Clearly, by his standards, the score of 0 represented significant 
underperformance. Should he therefore have been investigated for violation of integrity 
standards? 
 
Screening for manipulation cannot therefore rely on sports data alone. Specificity of the 
screen would be too low. At least for betting-related fixing, screening through monitoring of 
the betting markets associated with a sports event has proven much more fruitful. For 
example, in well-regulated jurisdictions in Europe, bookmakers are obliged to report 
‘suspicious’ activity. Their algorithms will, for example, generate an alert if there is 
exceptional volume of betting on an event and it is spatially concentrated in a town where the 
bets placed have been predominantly for the local team to lose. 
 
Monitoring of national betting markets through such mechanisms has brought to light several 
match fixes, often instigated by players to allow them and their families to make extra 
money. But it is insufficient to protect sport against the largest fixing operations. Organised 
crime carries out such operations on an industrial scale (their modus operandi vividly 
illustrated in Hill, 2010). In the first such case to come to public attention, criminals based in 
Bochum, Germany, were convicted of fixing 320 football matches in 13 countries. In this and 
subsequent cases, prosecutors showed that the betting activity associated with fixing was 
largely conducted in Asian markets regardless of where the sports event took place. The 
liquidity in Asian markets on cricket, football, and many other sports dominates that in the 
rest of the World, allowing larger bets to be placed and consequently greater profits to be 
made from a given fix. Further, betting is barely regulated in Asia (even where legal at all) 
and most of the volume is generated through agents of licensed offshore operators such that it 
would not be possible to trace stakes back to source if suspicions arose concerning a 
particular match. Asian markets are therefore where ‘professional’ fixers will almost 
invariably conduct their betting operations. 
 
This suggests that systematic monitoring of global betting markets is highly desirable in 
order to identify instances where there is abnormal betting activity consistent with a fix 
having been arranged. In contrast to monitoring of national markets in well-regulated 
countries, screening in international markets must depend on observing only odds. Volumes 
of bets on particular outcomes cannot be observed in the unregulated and illegal sectors; but 
operators have to reveal odds through their websites in order to conduct their business. 
Inferences can then be made about betting volumes.  
 
Football has the longest experience of funding systematic monitoring of global betting 
markets by specialist contractors in order to alert governing bodies to activity suggestive of a 
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fix. For example, UEFA commissions monitoring of international markets (represented by 
several hundred betting websites) for all matches in its own competitions and all matches in 
the top two divisions of each of the 55 national football associations which make up its 
membership. Latterly, following cases at the Court of Arbitration for Sport where sanctions 
based on evidence from monitoring systems have been confirmed, most other leading sports, 
such as badminton, rugby and, in North America, Major League Baseball and the National 
Hockey League, have followed suit.   
  
In this paper we describe the theory behind such monitoring systems, and provide illustrative 
examples of the process in action. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The 
next section provides an overview of the logic behind monitoring betting markets to detect 
corruption. Section 3 follows with the description of mathematical models for forecasting the 
results of football and tennis matches whilst a match is in progress. Mathematical modelling 
is at the heart of monitoring systems because identifying where odds are behaving 
abnormally depends on algorithms being able to generate benchmark odds so that actual odds 
movements can be compared with what would be expected given the state of the game. In 
Section 4 we provide some illustrative examples of both regular matches (those believed to 
be corruption-free) and matches believed to have been manipulated.  Section 5 describes the 
use of the tools presented here in practice and Section 6 offers some closing thoughts. 
 
 
3. Monitoring Betting Markets for Corruption 
 
Essentially, the effect of a fix on the betting market is a special case of insider trading in 
financial markets. The fixers have information unknown to the rest of the market: that some 
participants in the match will attempt to manipulate events to bring about a particular 
outcome. They (and other parties that know of the fix and wish to make a profit from it) will 
place bets on the outcome they have sought to arrange. This additional betting will raise 
volume above what would normally be expected. In regulated markets, abnormal volume 
(where the additional money is biased in favour of one particular outcome) is the key metric 
for triggering investigation.  
 
Figure 1 shows the volumes of bets placed with a UK bookmaker on the outcome of the first 
frame in the first round of matches of snooker’s UK Championship in 2008. Fixing a minor 
component of a match (here the first frame) may be more appealing to the player than 
planning to lose the whole thing. However, liquidity is liable to be low in the market on a 
single frame, such that ‘unexpected betting’ would be very obvious. Indeed in some matches 
in this tournament, the bookmaker took no bets at all on the first frame. In one match, 
however, the bookmaker took £3,754 that Stephen Hendry would beat Stephen Lee on the 
first frame. The unexpected volume and its being placed overwhelmingly on one side of the 
bet triggered suspicion. Subsequently Lee was suspended from competition on match-fixing 
charges, including one related to this match, and received a twelve-year ban from the sport 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/snooker/24114861). 
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Figure 1: Volume bet on winner of first frame in first round matches at snooker’s UK Championship in 2008. 
 
Monitoring of volume on national, regulated markets has thrown up a number of such cases 
across sports such as football and handball as well as snooker. However, as noted above, 
large-scale fixers will typically bet on Asian markets, to take advantage of the high liquidity 
and lack of official scrutiny. Monitoring of these markets has necessarily to be of odds rather 
than volume because only odds can be observed. Fortunately, Asian bookmakers tend 
towards a book-balancing business model such that any net inflow of money that a particular 
outcome will occur will automatically be met with a shortening of the odds on that outcome 
and lengthening of odds on other outcomes. This continuous realignment of the odds to 
minimise operator risk from over-exposure to one outcome allows monitoring systems to 
interpret odds movements as reflective of relative amounts being wagered on the different 
outcomes. For example, if observed odds for a particular event outcome fall sharply, this may 
be taken as indicative that bets arriving in the market are predominantly being placed in 
support of that outcome coming to pass.  
 
The basic concept behind the monitoring of betting market odds is rooted in the notion that 
market odds may be interpreted as probabilistic forecasts of outcome probabilities. ‘Forecast 
efficiency’ as a general concept refers to the extent to which information is incorporated into 
forecasts (Nordhaus, 1987). Studies of betting markets have generally concluded that odds 
(corrected for the presence of implicit bookmaker commission built into these prices) broadly 
satisfy this assumption of forecast efficiency, albeit with the exception of favourite-longshot 
bias in markets on some sports (Vaughan Williams, 1999). Moreover this conclusion begins 
to be validated for contemporary in-play markets also. For example, Croxson & Reade (2011) 
demonstrate that betting exchange odds adjust fully and rapidly in response to the arrival of a 
goal in a football game. 
 
A well-constructed sports forecasting model should also produce efficient forecasts. In most 
situations, it should yield probabilities which correspond closely to those implied by odds in 
the betting market. Typically indeed they do so. 
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However, in the case of a fixed match, the fixers will place bets on the Asian betting markets 
such that the relative volumes of bets on the different event outcomes are not now congruent 
with the probabilities implied by the current odds. Asian bookmakers will respond by 
modifying the odds in an attempt to avoid over-exposure to the outcome favoured by the 
additional money in the market. The change in odds will reflect the knowledge that some 
traders have, that there is to be an attempt to manipulate the match. But this information is 
not known to the mathematical forecasting model. Hence probabilities implied by odds 
observed in the market will begin to diverge from model probabilities.  This divergence will 
grow as the fixers continue to pump money into the betting market and the bookmakers 
respond by adjusting the odds further. By looking for examples of this divergence between 
model and market probabilities, potentially fixed matches can be identified. 
 
 
4. In-play models 
 
Detecting match fixing relies on obtaining up-to-date betting market information and on 
having a reliable mathematical model to estimate the probabilities of the outcome of the 
sporting event as events unfold. Forecasting models exist for many sports. Cricket in 
particular has attracted much attention in the academic literature. Indeed, the Duckworth-
Lewis Method (Duckworth & Lewis, 1998) is essentially a forecasting model and was 
adopted by cricket’s governing bodies to determine the official results of matches which were 
not completed because of inclement weather. Since the publication of the original 
Duckworth-Lewis model, it has been refined further by McHale & Asif (2013) and Stern 
(2016) for example. Other authors have employed concepts from the Duckworth-Lewis 
model to develop explicit forecasting models, noted by them as relevant in betting markets 
(Bailey & Clarke, 2006, Akhtar & Scarf, 2012). Further, Asif & McHale (2016) plot, for 
sample games from One Day International cricket, in-play betting odds and the probabilities 
implied by a statistical model and demonstrate that the betting market acts ‘logically’ in the 
sense that odds typically track model probabilities. 
 
In the remainder of this section we describe models for forecasting the results of a football 
match in-play, and the result of a tennis match in-play. 
 
4.1 In-play models of football 
Forecasting models for football are either pre-match or in-play. Pre-match forecasting models 
estimate either (a) the probabilities of the match finishing in each possible scoreline (0-0, 1-0, 
0-1, 1-1, and so on), or (b) the match result probabilities (win, draw, loss). Of course, the 
estimated scoreline probabilities from the first type of model can be summed to obtain the 
match result probabilities. In-play models estimate the final scoreline in a match once the 
match has begun using estimated team scoring rates. In fact, the core task of forecasting the 
results of football matches, be it pre-match or in-play, is that of estimating appropriate 
scoring rates for the two teams in a particular match, based on their records of scoring and 
conceding goals in previous matches. 
 
In a seminal paper on forecasting in football by Maher (1982) the number of goals by each 
team in a match were assumed to follow a Poisson distribution in which the scoring rates 
depended on the attacking strength of the team and the defensive strength of the opposition. 
Since then, research has focussed on making improvements to the Maher model. For 
example, Dixon and Coles (1997) allowed more recent matches to influence the estimated 
attack and defence strengths more than matches further in the past, whilst Karlis & Ntzoufras 
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(2000) proposed a diagonally inflated bivariate Poisson model to allow for a higher frequency 
of observed draws than would be expected under the independent Poisson model. McHale & 
Scarf (2007) used a copula to induce a bivariate distribution allowing for dependence 
between the numbers of goals scored by the two teams in a match. More recently Koopman 
& Lit (2015) used a state-space model to allow team strengths to vary stochastically. In 
Boshnakov et al. (2017), the authors propose a Weibull count model as an alternative discrete 
distribution to the Poisson model used previously. But in all of these models, the central task 
is to estimate the scoring rates of the two teams in a particular match. 
 
The papers discussed above deal with pre-match forecasting. Somewhat surprisingly given 
the popularity of in-play betting in football, models for forecasting the results of matches, 
once the match has begun are rare in the academic literature. Dixon & Robinson (1998) 
present a paper dealing with in-play forecasting in football and use a bivariate birth process to 
estimate the hazard (instantaneous scoring rate) of the two teams scoring throughout a match. 
Titman et al. (2015) present a similar model but allow for both an interdependence between 
the goals scored by the two teams and the yellow and red cards received by the two teams. 
Volf (2009) presents a semi-parametric Cox model for the scoring hazards. 
 
These models typically allow three variables to affect the hazards of scoring for the two 
teams in a football match: (i) the passing of time, (ii) the awarding of red cards, (iii) the 
current score line. Once the hazards have been estimated, forecasts are produced using 
Monte-Carlo simulation whereby each minute of the match is simulated for the occurrence of 
any goals and propagated forward until the match is complete (typically this is set to around 
93 minutes to allow for any injury time added at the end of the game). 
 
In the bookmaking industry, it is typical that scoring rates of the teams are first estimated 
using a pre-match model, before subjective adjustments are made by specialist expert traders. 
The traders adjust the scoring rates in light of information that the model used for estimating 
scoring rates would not know. For example, an injury to a key player might be expected to 
reduce a team’s scoring rate (or increase the opposition’s scoring rate). 
 
Given a pair of scoring rates for the two teams in a match, minute-by-minute scoring rates are 
estimated by distributing them across the minutes of a match. These minute-by-minute 
scoring rates effectively approximate the hazards of scoring that would normally be estimated 
using a survival model. Figure 2 shows the relative frequency of goals per minute in all 
matches from the English Premier League between the 2007-2008 and 2017-2018 seasons. 
Ignoring the spikes at minutes 45 and 90 where extra minutes of play have been added 
together, the scoring rate can be seen to increase throughout the match. Traders in the 
bookmaking industry typically distribute the estimated scoring rates in proportion to the 
distribution depicted in Figure 2. The resulting minute-by-minute scoring rates are then used 
to simulate the goals scored in the remaining minutes of the match, and the outcome of the 
simulations reveal the probabilities of the match ending in each and every possible scoreline. 
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Figure 2: Relative frequency of goals scored in each minute of football match played in the English Premier League 
between the 2007-2008 and 2017-2018 seasons. 
4.2 In-play models of tennis 
Just as forecasting in football centres around the task of estimating team scoring rates, in-play 
forecasting for tennis focusses on the key task of estimating the probability that a player will 
win a point on serve given he/she is playing against a given other player. Further, analogous 
to estimating attack and defence strengths of football teams, the probability of winning a 
point on serve depends on both that player’s serving ability and the opposing player’s 
returning ability. Once the probability of winning a point on serve is known for both players, 
and assuming this stays constant throughout a match (an assumption shown to be 
approximately true in Klaassen & Magnus, 2001, and considered further by Viney & 
Bedford, 2018), the match win probabilities can be derived analytically. 
 
Klaassen & Magnus (2003) present such a model and use it to forecast the outcome of 
matches at the Wimbledon tournament, whilst Barnett (2006) presents derivations of all 
closed expressions for using point-win probabilities to calculating game-win, set-win and 
match-win probabilities. Barnett & Clarke (2005) present a methodology for combining 
player statistics on serve and return to estimate the probability of a player winning a point on 
serve. Spanias & Knottenbelt (2013) use tennis player statistics in a Markov Chain model for 
in-play forecasting and explicitly recognise that their model could be used as an input into 
fraud detection.  
 
 
5. Examples  
 
In this section we provide examples of using in-play models and betting markets to detect 
potentially fixed matches in football and tennis. The data were provided by Sportradar, the 
organisation charged with providing alerts of potential fixing to the governing bodies of 
European and world football, UEFA and FIFA, and one of the governing bodies of men’s 
professional tennis, the ATP. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the betting odds and the odds implied by an in-play football model for 
the ‘Asian Totals’ market on two particular matches. Asian Totals is typically a very liquid 
market. Bookmakers quote a benchmark for the total number of goals over the whole game 
and bettors may wager that the final number will be either over or under this benchmark.  A 
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bookmaker might offer odds of say 1.8 that the total goals in the match will be over 2.5. The 
punter will win the bet (collecting $1.80 for each $1 staked, a profit of $0.80) if there are 3 or 
more goals in the match, but lose the bet if there are only 0, 1 or 2 goals in the match. The 
baseline of 2.5 goals switches depending on the odds being offered, and on the current 
scoreline. For example, once three goals have been scored in a match, offering a market on 
‘under 2.5 goals’ would be meaningless. Or, as a match nears its end, bets on ‘under 3 goals’ 
would have to be offered at extremely short odds if the score were currently 1-0; this would 
be unappealing to customers, so the bookmaker might switch to offering odds on over-or-
under-2 goals instead. Note that the benchmark number of goals in the Asian Totals market 
may be quoted to a quarter of a goal. For example, the bettor is invited to wager over or under 
2.25 goals. This has a particular meaning in the context of Asian Totals rules. Suppose, for 
instance the bettor chooses ‘over 2.25’. If three goals are scored, the bet is won. If only one 
goal is scored, the bet is lost. But, if exactly two goals are scored, the bettor forfeits only half 
the stake.    
 
The odds implied by the mathematical model are depicted as black lines in Figures 3 to 7, 
and are derived from proprietary models used by Sportradar. We have shown the odds 
calculated using this mathematical model since these are the ones actually used in application 
of monitoring for UEFA, FIFA and the ATP. Forrest & McHale (2015) provide a detailed 
analysis of the models used by Sportradar to generate probabilities for football and find that 
there is a high level of agreement between Sportradar’s proprietary model and the model 
presented above, and that the estimated probabilities do indeed represent the empirical 
frequencies of outcomes of football matches. 
 
In Figure 3, the market odds (various colours) and the odds calculated from the mathematical 
model (black), follow each other closely. As the match progresses, and the time remaining for 
further goals runs out, the odds increase (probability decreases) for there being more than the 
baseline number of goals. A goal is scored in the 43rd minute, and the market switches from 
‘over-under 1.25 goals’ to ‘over-under 2 goals’. 
 
 
Figure 3: Market odds and model odds for an example of a football match where odds evolve in the expected way.  
The odds are shown for the Asian Totals market. The black lines represent the odds implied by the mathematical 
model, whilst the coloured lines show the actual odds offered by a betting operator (for various totals goals markets). 
Vertical green lines represent goals and vertical red lines represent red cards. The shaded grey area represents the 
half-time period. 
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of market and model odds for a match reported by the 
monitoring agency as likely to have been manipulated. From the very first minute, the model 
odds and the market begin to diverge. From minute 18 to 31 for example, the model odds 
show how the odds increase on the over 2.25 goals bet. This is intuitively what one would 
expect: as the match progresses, there is less time for goals to be scored and so the 
probability of more than 2.25 goals will decrease, such that the odds offered should increase. 
The market, shown by the pink line, does the exact opposite and the odds actually decrease 
on there being more than 2.25 goals. This pattern continues throughout the match. Evidently 
some bettors were more confident than the model would entitle them to be that, eventually, 
the goals would be scored (and indeed the late goals anticipated in the market duly appeared). 
 
Figure 4: Market odds and model odds for a real example of a football match reported as likely to have been 
manipulated.  The odds are shown for the Asian Totals market. The black lines represent the odds implied by the 
mathematical model, whilst the coloured lines show the actual odds offered by the market (for various totals goals 
markets). Vertical green lines represent goals and vertical red lines represent red cards. The shaded grey area 
represents the half-time period. 
Unlike Figure 4, Figure 5 depicts the evolution of odds in a match where at first, the two sets 
of odds are in agreement. For the first 20 minutes of the match the black line representing the 
model odds and the lines representing the market odds are in almost exact agreement. From 
minute 20 the odds begin to diverge. This is likely due to the fixers delaying placing wagers 
until the match is well underway. But once the bets begin to be recognised by the market, the 
odds quickly begin to behave perversely. The orange line representing the odds for over 3.5 
goals, decreases sharply, despite there being only 2 goals in the match to that point, and time 
running out for the goals to be scored that would make that bet a winning one. 
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Figure 5: Market odds and model odds for a second real example of a football match believed to have been 
manipulated.  The odds are shown for the Asian Totals market. The black lines represent the odds implied by the 
mathematical model, whilst the coloured lines show the actual odds offered by the market (for various totals goals 
markets). Vertical green lines represent goals and vertical red lines represent red cards. The shaded grey area 
represents the half-time period. 
Figures 6 and 7 show market and model odds for the outcomes of two tennis matches. The 
match depicted in Figure 6 is a match free of suspicion of fixing. After each game, the match 
odds for player 1 winning adjust to the latest information, and it is clear that the model (black 
line) and market (blue line) are very much in agreement as to the likely outcome of the 
match. 
 
Figure 6: Market odds and model odds for tennis match where odds evolve in the expected way. The odds are shown 
for player 1 winning the match. The black line represents the odds implied by the mathematical model, whilst the 
blue line shows the actual odds offered by the market. The x-axis gives the game score in each of the 3 sets played in 
the match (player 1’s games are shown first). 
Figure 7 shows the model and market odds for a tennis match suspected to have been 
manipulated. In this case, player 1 was very much the pre-match underdog. Odds implied by 
the model shortened as events unfolded and a win for the underdog became more likely. But, 
from very early on in the match, the market odds were lower than the model odds for player 1 
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winning, i.e. market expectations of a surprise result were stronger than sporting logic would 
have suggested. 
 
Figure 7: Market odds and model odds for a real example of a tennis match reported as likely to have been 
manipulated. The odds are shown for player 1 winning the match. The black line represents the odds implied by the 
mathematical model, whilst the blue line shows the actual odds offered by the market. The x-axis gives the game 
score in each of the 2 sets played in the match (player 1’s games are shown first). 
 
6. A Match fixing detection system in practice 
 
Fixers may place their wagers in either or (more typically) both the pre-match and in-play 
markets. Spreading their money across both markets (and indeed, in the case of football, 
across the main types of bet, total goals, result in terms of home/ draw/away, and margin of 
victory) reduces the risk of detection. Nevertheless the bulk of their ‘investment’ will usually 
be in-play because here greater profit may be obtained. For example, their strategy may be to 
take much of their profit by betting that a team will lose by more than X goals (a popular 
market). They arrange for players on that team to make sufficient defensive errors in the 
second half to bring about the desired result. In the average case, since the match is initially 
played in a normal way, the odds for bets on that result will lengthen because less and less 
time is available for the required goals to be scored. Profit will therefore be greater if the 
nefarious money is fed into the market as odds lengthen than if the same bet in favour of a 
large defeat for the particular team had been placed pre-match.  
 
Van Rompuy (2015) had access to data relating to 1,468 (Worldwide) football matches which 
the monitoring service Sportradar had reported as suspicious over a period of five years. In 
67% of these matches, betting market anomalies had been detected in both pre-match and in-
play markets. This and other statistics presented by Van Rompuy confirm that the presence of 
a fixing operation is likely to impact odds both before and during a match. 
 
Sportradar’s algorithms, applied to a continuous stream of odds data from hundreds of 
websites, work differently pre-match and in-play. Before the match, most alerts are triggered 
by sharp shifts in odds whereas in-play monitoring focuses on deviation of observed odds 
from the odds predicted by the mathematical model. Here we concentrate on the in-play 
market, which is where most betting (legitimate and nefarious alike) takes place. Our 
description of procedures and related statistics were obtained while conducting an audit of the 
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Sportradar system on behalf of UEFA, one of its principal clients. As such, our observations 
relate to monitoring in football.  
 
A first practical issue in setting up monitoring is the fixing of thresholds which have to be 
exceeded before the algorithms trigger an alert. Naturally the mathematical model, which is 
only a forecasting model, will never track the evolution of observed odds exactly as there will 
be ‘noise’ in the latter series. So a judgement must be made as to how much deviation should 
be required before the system triggers an alert. The answer to this question will be different 
for different levels of competition (for example a greater deviation is tolerated for minor 
matches where the betting market is thin and so even a single moderate bet might induce a 
non-trivial movement in odds) but in all cases will depend on the relative importance of 
sensitivity and specificity in the task at hand. Low thresholds will generate a relatively large 
number of false positives but high thresholds may lead to the system missing true fixing 
cases. 
 
The task in hand at this stage is not in fact to generate a final verdict on whether a match fix 
has been attempted but rather to determine whether the betting market activity observed 
should be subject to scrutiny by expert analysts. Such scrutiny would be necessary in any 
monitoring system screening for manipulation because deviation in observed odds from the 
odds predicted by the mathematical model may not in fact be illogical. The in-play 
forecasting model captures the influence of team strengths, the current score, the number of 
minutes remaining and whether either team has been reduced in size by a red card 
(disciplinary dismissal of a player from the field). But the betting market might have access 
to additional information relevant to match outcomes. For example, odds in an efficient 
market would reflect an increase in the expected number of goals if one of the goalkeepers 
had been injured and replaced by a much less able substitute. In this case, deviation of the 
odds from those implied by the mathematical model should not be a cause for concern. 
Again, those viewing a match or following a commentary will be able to form a judgement 
on the momentum in the game which will give them information relevant to what direction 
the game will take. Indeed McIver et al. (2018) carried out textual analysis of ball-by-ball 
cricket commentaries and found that the incidence of positive or negative remarks about 
batsmen and bowlers anticipated future wickets. In similar vein, Brown et al. (2018) 
examined tweets during English Premier League football matches and reported that an 
increase in positive-tone tweets about a team coincided with a significantly raised probability 
that the team would go on to win. Each of these papers illustrates that there is match specific 
information which is not accounted for in the generic statistical models used by bookmakers 
to set odds and by monitoring systems in detecting corruption. Hence deviations from 
between markets odds and model odds will always need to be assessed in case events in the 
match provide a plausible reason for the deviation. 
 
Given that the application of the algorithms can only be the first stage in a process, it is 
reasonable at this stage that sensitivity should be prioritised over specificity. In fact, 
thresholds appear to be set low in Sportradar’s system because, of 45,569 matches covered 
during a one year period, 33.2% triggered at least one alert at the level where the test result 
was determined as ‘positive’ and passed on to analysts. 
 
Analysts are experts recruited for their knowledge of both sport and of betting markets. When 
an alert is issued, it goes straight to the desk of one of the duty analysts whose role is to carry 
out an immediate preliminary assessment of whether there is a legitimate explanation for the 
betting market anomaly. The analyst has access to multiple information sources and to data 
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feeds from the match. He might conclude that the irregular behaviour in the odds was 
adequately explained by circumstances in either the betting market or in the sporting event. 
For example, a minor league might be facing more competition for betting volume on a 
particular day because of unusually heavy fixture lists in other competitions; this could mean 
that the standard thresholds for identifying deviations of observed from expected odds are 
unrealistically low and the deviations reported by the algorithms reasonable given the lower 
than usual liquidity in the market. On the sporting side, social media reports may tell of 
intense pressure on the goal of one of the teams such that scoring seems much more likely 
than the mathematical model predicts. In fact, most matches considered by Sportradar 
analysts at this stage are discarded from further review. In the year of data we examined, 
15,129 matches generated alerts but only 7.95% of these were ‘hotlisted’ by the analyst (i.e. 
referred to the third and final stage of the screening process).  
 
That final stage usually takes place on the following day. Overnight, information on events in 
the game, and video of incidents where available, are collected from country correspondents, 
typically journalists, engaged permanently by Sportradar to provide reports on local football 
(their regular reports on player injuries, etc, inform assessment of unexpected odds in pre-
match markets). The full team of analysts on duty considers and discusses the ‘hotlisting’ 
report and the additional information assembled overnight and determines whether or not the 
match should be ‘escalated’, i.e. classified as ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to have been 
manipulated. In this case a comprehensive report giving the reasons for suspicion is prepared 
for the relevant governing body. In the year of data we examined, only 24% of matches 
initially hotlisted were subsequently escalated. These 291 matches represented 0.64% of all 
matches monitored during the twelve months we examined. The great shrinkage in the 
number of matches classified as suspicious between the alert and escalation stages reflects an 
evident shift towards emphasising specificity over sensitivity in successive stages of the 
screening process.      
 
The description here shows that a considerable infrastructure is required to support the initial 
screening by algorithms. Investment is needed in systematic access to multiple sources of 
information as well as employment of valuable human expertise if the final classification of a 
match as suspicious is to be credible. The important role of judgement in the procedures 
should not, however, detract from an appreciation of the key role of forensic statistics in the 
output from monitoring. Essentially, modelling is the key to effective, automated 
identification of potentially fixed matches. Experts then search for legitimate explanations for 
the betting market anomalies that have triggered alerts. Where no plausible explanation can 
be found, the match will be reported as suspicious. Naturally the report will be more 
convincing if unusual odds movements are followed by on-field events that they appear to 
foretell (for example, the market seems illogically to favour two very late goals and they are 
then duly scored after two dubious penalties are awarded). Nevertheless, some matches are 
reported even without such corroboration by events because the odds movements are highly 
suggestive of a fix being attempted but not succeeding. 
 
Reports of likely fixed matches do not always get to be fully investigated by the sports 
governing body. However, in several cases, they have led to detailed inquiry, supported by 
police and leading to convictions. One well known example was in Australian soccer. Three 
English players, each of whom had previously played for clubs in English tier-6 (Conference 
South) which had taken part in matches suspected of match fixing, transferred together to a 
minor club, Southern Stars, in the State of Victoria. Subsequently a number of its matches 
were identified as likely to have been manipulated. Victoria police then obtained evidence of 
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links between the players and criminals and built a case sufficient to secure conviction of the 
three players and their criminal handler. 
 
This and other successful outcomes in the criminal justice system have been achieved by 
police gathering physical evidence (for example, telephone records or bank transfers between 
players/ referees and criminals) to support a prima facie case made from the application of 
forensic statistics to the betting market. But law enforcement is not always willing to allocate 
resources to such cases nor can it be certain that adequate physical evidence can be 
assembled to satisfy the high standard of proof required in a criminal court. This raises the 
interesting question of whether betting market analysis can ever be an adequate basis for the 
governing body acting to protect its own sport by using its own disciplinary procedures 
(where standard of proof tends to be balance of probability rather than beyond reasonable 
doubt). 
 
Two important cases in the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) have tested the ability of 
football authorities to impose sanctions where the statistical analysis indicates likely 
manipulation but detailed supporting evidence is unavailable (indeed, to protect the 
credibility of their events, sports governing bodies may wish to impose sanctions even if a 
criminal investigation is still in progress). 
 
The first case (CAS 2016/A/4650, Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v. UEFA) followed the exclusion 
of the Albanian club KS Skenderbeu from the European Champions League. Several of its 
matches, domestic and European, had been reported as suspicious by Sportradar. UEFA had 
used powers to exclude a club from its competitions to protect the reputation of those 
competitions. Having exhausted internal UEFA appeals procedures, Skenderbeu took the 
case to the CAS. The Court confirmed the exclusion. Although it cited some supporting 
evidence, such as the public statement of an opposition player about unusual play by 
Skenderbeu, the Court’s Judgement rested heavily on the Sportradar reports and on testimony 
as to the robustness of the Sportradar monitoring system by Forrest & McHale (2015). In a 
commentary on the published Judgement, Kerr (2017) notes that the Forrest & McHale study 
was cited at five separate points as grounds for the FDS being correct and that the Judgement 
also states that Forrest and McHale’s ‘‘expert evidence’’ was ‘‘not rebutted by differing 
expert evidence’’. 
 
The Skenderbeu case was widely taken as a precedent. Blackshaw (2018, p. 244)), himself a 
CAS Arbitrator, wrote that ‘it is generally considered that, as a result of the CAS Award in 
the Skenderbeu match fixing case, it should be easier for Sports Governing Bodies to 
sanction match fixers’. Indeed, following the case, new sports appeared more ready to 
subscribe to services offered by Sportradar and other monitoring companies. 
 
The Skenderbeu case was, however, relatively easy in the sense that UEFA depended on its 
rule that clubs could be held vicariously responsible for wrongdoing. It was sufficient to 
demonstrate (from the statistical analysis of betting odds) that a fix had likely occurred. No 
individuals were sanctioned, so it was not necessary to produce evidence of who had 
executed the fix.  
 
The next case of note was, however, different in that it involved sanctioning of an individual. 
FIFA had banned referee Joseph Lamptey for life after its disciplinary panels concluded that 
he had manipulated a World Cup qualifying match in 2016. In 2017, the CAS heard Mr. 
Lamptey’s appeal (CAS 2017/A/5173, Lamptey v. FIFA). Five betting services- Sportradar, 
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EWS, GLMS, Starlizard and Genius Sports- had all reported very unusual odds movements 
in markets on total goals, with the unusual activity immediately preceding the scoring of two 
goals which had resulted from what had seemed to have been blatantly incorrect refereeing 
decisions.  
 
The Court Judgement again validated the logic behind monitoring systems. Its Judgement 
(para. 83) emphasised that ‘the deviation from the expected, ordinary movement in odds on 
‘overs’ in the Match, contradicting the mathematical model, is a decisive sign that bettors had 
some information that the mathematical model did not have and expected that at least two 
goals be scored irrespective of the lapse of time’. It found ‘remarkable’ that odds which had 
behaved normally for most of the match, had deviated from expected odds immediately 
before two goals were scored as a result of referee decisions, and had then returned to what 
the mathematical model predicted.  Following the CAS award, FIFA ordered the replay of the 
match. The result was reversed, with Senegal and not South Africa now the winner, and 
Senegal duly won its place at the World Cup in Russia. 
 
From its very explicit validation of the conceptual framework behind monitoring- the 
comparison between observed odds and odds predicted by a mathematical model- the Court’s 
Judgement in this case provides further encouragement for the continued use of mathematical 
analysis in detecting manipulation in sport. Of course there is also potential to apply this 
forensic approach to the analysis of sports as well as betting data since this could reveal 
where players have underperformed to a significant degree. However, given that performance 
levels in sport are subject to wild variation, attempts to detect fixing via this route alone 
would yield too many false positives. It seems likely that future monitoring systems will have 
to include analysis of betting data even if it comes in time to be supplemented by analysis of 
the rich data now generated by professional sports matches. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Online technology has helped generate betting markets with enormous levels of liquidity, 
which attract those seeking to make profits from match fixing. This paper describes how 
forensic statistics can be used to detect match fixing and combat the threat match fixing poses 
to sport integrity. At the heart of the detection algorithms lie in-play forecasting models 
whose predictions are compared to the odds being offered on betting markets. Suspicions are 
raised in instances where the market odds and the model odds diverge. 
 
We provide real examples of monitoring for football and tennis matches, and describe how 
suspicious matches are investigated by expert analysts before finally being brought to the 
attention of the relevant governing body. We further cite two court cases in which forensic 
statistics played a central role in the fight against corruption in sport. 
 
Following the success of monitoring systems in, for example, football and tennis, major 
North American leagues such as Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League 
have adopted systems to monitor betting markets in search of fixes. 
  
The adoption of forensic statistics by sports governing bodies should be seen as success story 
for mathematics and it is clear that mathematical modelling will continue to be at the heart of 
processes to protect sport from the risk of corruption. 
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